Battlefields from Ukraine to Gaza have recently been marked, as have many conflicts over the last two decades, by the extensive use of airborne assets, surveillance, and computing power in pursuit of victory. Both precision guided weapons and unmanned vehicles create new and heavy demands on training and logistics, as well as whole organizational structures devoted to finding targets. In this regard, the datafication of the battlefield and the automation of targeting has reached a modern-day zenith, on the heels of decades of theorizing about “information dominance” in warfare.
However, this digital-age collection and targeting process is founded on a premise of fierce optimization and brutal efficiency. The resulting model of warfare is both a product of physical observation and digital construction. It is process-driven, techno-centric, and ultimately premised on being entirely calculable. A model of warfare which demands efficiency above all else not only risks fostering a disregard for pragmatism and efficacy, but is also arguably a subtle cover for the exercise of institutional power and control. This article critiques an overly reductive model of war, in the context of increasing demands for greater automation and applications of artificial intelligence (AI) which are widely presumed to be fixtures in future conflict.
Author
More on Asia
