Asia, China
Cameron Wilkie
Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations

China has the world’s largest navy, but there are important questions about its ability to contest the United States on a global scale. To do so, China would need more overseas bases than the two it currently has in Djibouti and Cambodia. Similarly, its aircraft carriers cannot sustain high-tempo aviation operations beyond the First Island Chain for an extended period. Developing super-quiet attack submarines would markedly improve China’s ability to conduct blue-water operations. However, to date, China has not fielded submarines that match the technological capabilities of U.S. boats. A careful examination of China’s naval strength shows that while it is well-positioned to wage a war close to its shores, the PLAN is not a global peer of the U.S. Navy.

Challenges to Chinese blue-water operations
NATO, Europe, Grand strategy, Burden shifting, Ukraine
Defense Priorities
Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine

Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.

Year three: Limiting U.S. ambitions in Ukraine
Grand strategy, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is ...

The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.

Israel-Saudi normalization agreement: What is in it for the U.S.?
Burden sharing, Basing, Grand strategy, Iran, Middle East
Defense Priorities
Understanding the Israel-Hamas war

The Israel-Hamas conflict shows little signs of slowing down, and the risk of a wider war remains credible. This brief examines and addresses the complex dynamics at play that could cause the crisis to expand, and it clearly defines parameters for how the U.S. should navigate the conflict. Washington should avoid direct U.S. military involvement, work with all parties to prevent escalation, and redeploy troops out of Syria—and eventually Iraq—which denies Iran leverage for broadening the war.

Understanding the Israel-Hamas war
Asia, China, Burden sharing
Defense Priorities
Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for ...

The balance of power in East Asia has shifted in China's favor, but it does not follow that China constitutes a major threat to the territorial integrity or political independence of all neighboring states. As DEFP Non-Resident Fellow Peter Harris argues in a new explainer, upholding peace and stability in East Asia does not require U.S. military primacy. U.S. efforts to dominate the region could backfire by intensifying the U.S.-China rivalry and plunging East Asia into a new cold war. A more sensible approach would be to move toward an offshore balancing posture that incentivizes capable regional states to provide for their own defense and deter Chinese aggression.

Moving to an offshore balancing strategy for East Asia

Syria

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Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

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Withdraw U.S. troops from Syria and Iraq

The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly to the 3,400 personnel in Iraq and Syria. But there is no good reason for U.S. forces to be there. The U.S. presence needlessly risks war by allowing Iran and militias it funds to threaten U.S. troops. ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the groups’ remnants, and the United States can still strike from a long distance if necessary. U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Iraq and Syria as part of a broader effort to deprioritize the Middle East and avoid an ill-advised conflict with Iran.

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Reset U.S.-Syria policy

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Reset U.S.-Syria policy

Washington’s current Syria policy is failing and misguided, and it should be abandoned for one consistent with U.S. interests. The approximately 900 U.S. military forces in northeastern Syria lack a justifying rationale given the last ISIS-held territory was liberated in March 2019, more than four years ago—continued occupation with so few forces, and without a vital U.S. security goal, runs needless risks with imperceptible potential gains. U.S. forces are vulnerable to local militias with local aims that could otherwise not reach them. Existing sanctions punish regular Syrians in service of unrealistic, unnecessary regime-change goals. Syria is a strategically unimportant country that poses no direct threat to the United States nor its limited and diminishing interests in the Middle East. With higher priorities at home and in Asia, the U.S. should recalibrate sanctions and end its open-ended presence in Syria.

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Apply the logic of the Afghanistan withdrawal to Syria

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Apply the logic of the Afghanistan withdrawal to Syria

The United States should apply the lessons learned in Afghanistan to Syria and pull out its ground forces. President Biden noted two key reasons for exiting Afghanistan: military missions should have achievable objectives and strikes and raids from afar, instead of permanent occupation, are sufficient to thwart foreign terrorism against United States. Both conditions also apply to Syria, where the original mission to dismantle ISIS’s territorial caliphate, once achieved, morphed into an open-ended campaign with murky objectives divorced from U.S. security and from counterterrorism.

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It is time for U.S. troops to leave Syria

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It is time for U.S. troops to leave Syria

U.S. forces originally deployed to Syria to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate, which was achieved more than two years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Syria. Maintaining the current deployment needlessly prolongs the civil war, exacerbates suffering there as a result of the war's continuation, and risks drawing the U.S. into wider conflict.

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Leaving Iraq and Syria avoids war and aids Iran diplomacy

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Leaving Iraq and Syria avoids war and aids Iran diplomacy

The U.S. military presence in Iraq and Syria—unnecessary after the collapse of ISIS’s territorial caliphate—is today part of an unsuccessful compellence strategy against Iran. It is a potential “tripwire” that could cause an escalation toward a larger and needless conflict. A full U.S. military withdrawal would reduce the risks of war and aid President Biden’s efforts to pursue diplomacy with Iran and salvage the 2015 nuclear deal.

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A plan for U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East

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A plan for U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East

Over four years, the U.S. could reduce its presence in the Middle East by as many as 50,000 military personnel, mainly by drawing down its forces in four key states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE—and ending regular deployments to the region by carrier battle groups. Moving to the region’s periphery—drawing on existing bases and access agreements with Jordan and Oman—could position the U.S. to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

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U.S. foreign policy priorities for the next four years

The next four years are an opportunity for the U.S. to pursue a new, more realistic foreign policy. In addition to the urgent task of ending endless wars, the U.S. should focus on narrow missions in the Middle East to thwart anti-U.S. terror threats. In Europe, the U.S. should shift burdens to NATO members. And in East Asia, it should encourage allies to invest in defensive capabilities to strengthen deterrence. In all, abandoning the failed status quo in favor of a foreign policy based on restraint will mean a stronger America with more security at less cost and risk.

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Dealing with the remnants of ISIS

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Dealing with the remnants of ISIS

The U.S. should not keep troops in Syria and Iraq to fight ISIS’s remnants. ISIS’s loss of territory left its fighters operating in small groups, struggling to survive, and devastated its capacity to plot attacks. Local forces—Syria, Iraq, Kurds, Iran, and Shia militias—eagerly attack ISIS’s remnants. Misgovernment and sectarian divides might allow ISIS or some other radical Sunni jihadist entity to regain capability. But deployed U.S. forces do little to prevent that and risk sparking war with Iran or another state. If an ISIS dangerous to the U.S. does re-emerge, U.S. airstrikes and local allies can again target it.

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Keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria courts war

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Keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria courts war

Maximum pressure is an escalation strategy that courts war with Iran. It has already led to direct U.S.-Iran conflict and leaves U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Syria especially vulnerable to Iranian reprisals. Instead of the U.S. dictating the terms of engagement, keeping U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria allows Iran and other adversaries to target Americans at will. The likelihood for American fatalities to trigger a prolonged and costly war with Iran, combined with growing local hostility to the U.S. presence, makes it imperative to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq and Syria.

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Counter anti-U.S. terror threats with targeted raids, not permanent occupations

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Counter anti-U.S. terror threats with targeted raids, not permanent occupations

The death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi during a U.S. special forces raid follows the decisive military victory over ISIS’s caliphate. The raid’s success highlights U.S. intelligence capabilities—the globe’s most robust and well-funded—to locate anti-U.S. terrorists and the military’s ability to strike targets anywhere in the world, even without a local presence. With ISIS’s caliphate destroyed, the U.S. military mission is over. The U.S. should avoid being ensnared in another permanent policing mission, and instead methodically withdraw all remaining forces from Syria.

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Escaping the Syria trap

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Escaping the Syria trap

The fall of ISIS's caliphate should have concluded the military mission in Syria and led to a withdrawal of all U.S. forces. Failure to do so encouraged the Kurds to seek autonomy rather than protection from Damascus, which would have kept Turkey out, ISIS down, and the Kurds reasonably safe. Staying entangled in Syria has precipitated a crisis between Turkey and the Kurds, and left the U.S. with no appealing options. While the U.S. and Kurdish forces forged a partnership of convenience and mutual benefit to defeat a common adversary, the U.S. did not agree to adopt other Kurdish interests, nor should it. An orderly withdrawal of all U.S. forces is the only way to promote a sustainable status quo.

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Disentangling from Syria’s civil war

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Disentangling from Syria’s civil war

When President Obama, without congressional authorization, ordered U.S. forces to intervene in Syria, the mission was clear: liberate ISIS-held territory. That mission has been achieved. Leaving behind U.S. forces in Syria involves large risks without any security upside: it threatens to drive adversaries into allying against the United States; to inflame Islamist-nationalist sentiments in Iraq and Syria, making U.S. forces targets; and to risk U.S. conflict with Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Syria for no good reason. Staying also ties down U.S. forces and limits their focus on core missions. With ISIS’s “caliphate” destroyed, U.S. troops have achieved all they reasonably can and should be fully withdrawn.