Daniel DePetris
Fellow
Areas of expertise: Middle East policy, Iran, drone policy, diplomacy, counterterrorism, international relations
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Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities. He is also a syndicated foreign affairs columnist at the Chicago Tribune, a foreign affairs writer for Newsweek, and a writer for the Spectator. He also contributes to the Beltway Confidential, the Washington Examiner’s daily policy blog.
Research and writing
Despite Russia’s recent capture of Avdiivka, the war in Ukraine is entering its third year at a relative stalemate. Major changes to the 600-mile long frontline are few and far between, with Ukraine and Russia finding offensive warfare costly and resource-intensive. At the same time, neither side is willing to compromise on its maximalist aims, making talks on a ceasefire or end-of-war settlement remote. Yet with additional U.S. military aid to Ukraine stalled in Congress, questions arise as to how long the U.S. can maintain the status quo—and whether it even should. This brief argues that U.S. policy toward Ukraine and Europe overall is in need of significant reform. A combination of defensive security aid to the Ukrainian military, real burden-sharing in Europe and avoiding firm U.S. defense commitments to Ukraine has a better chance of accomplishing the limited U.S. interests at stake with less risk and at reasonable cost.
The war between Israel and Hamas has increased the threat to U.S. troops in the Middle East, particularly to the 3,400 personnel in Iraq and Syria. But there is no good reason for U.S. forces to be there. The U.S. presence needlessly risks war by allowing Iran and militias it funds to threaten U.S. troops. ISIS’s capabilities have been degraded, capable local actors eagerly hunt the groups’ remnants, and the United States can still strike from a long distance if necessary. U.S. forces should be withdrawn from Iraq and Syria as part of a broader effort to deprioritize the Middle East and avoid an ill-advised conflict with Iran.
The Israel-Saudi normalization deal is still alive and still could be a bad deal for the United States. The war in Gaza has pushed the sweeping U.S.-backed diplomatic normalization deal between Saudi Arabia and Israel to the back burner, but both governments are likely to try to revive it at some point. This brief examines the drivers of the normalization deal, analyzes the case for and against it from the perspective of U.S. interests, and concludes that it is not worth much to Americans—nothing like the reported concessions the United States was prepared to make. Security guarantees for Saudi Arabia in particular should be avoided.
Washington’s current Syria policy is failing and misguided, and it should be abandoned for one consistent with U.S. interests. The approximately 900 U.S. military forces in northeastern Syria lack a justifying rationale given the last ISIS-held territory was liberated in March 2019, more than four years ago—continued occupation with so few forces, and without a vital U.S. security goal, runs needless risks with imperceptible potential gains. U.S. forces are vulnerable to local militias with local aims that could otherwise not reach them. Existing sanctions punish regular Syrians in service of unrealistic, unnecessary regime-change goals. Syria is a strategically unimportant country that poses no direct threat to the United States nor its limited and diminishing interests in the Middle East. With higher priorities at home and in Asia, the U.S. should recalibrate sanctions and end its open-ended presence in Syria.
U.S.-Iran nuclear diplomacy is on the brink of collapse. A year after President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, Iran restarted and advanced its nuclear program. Despite re-engaging with Tehran diplomatically, the Biden administration has so far failed to revive the JCPOA in large part because the administration continues its predecessor’s approach of maximum pressure. If the administration doesn’t shift course, it will likely destroy the JCPOA, and Iran will move toward a bomb. This predictable failure, however, would not justify preventive military strikes that could result in U.S.-Iran war.
Targeted killings, usually by drone and air strikes from afar, are an overused tool in U.S. counterterrorism policy. They prioritize short-term results over longer-term outcomes, tactics over strategic effect. The U.S. does face threats, and the correct number of targeted killings abroad is unlikely to ever reach zero. Yet U.S. strikes should be limited to exceptional circumstances, where taking life stops terrorists with the intent and capability to attack the U.S.
The U.S. security interest in Afghanistan is unchanged after it ended its nearly 20-year occupation: defend against terrorists with the capability and intent to strike the U.S. To aid its counterterrorism goals, the U.S. could take steps to ease some sanctions and restrictions on the Taliban. This would also help relieve an economic crisis which threatens to starve many Afghans, who should not be punished for their government’s past sins
Supporters of the U.S. “maximum pressure” strategy on Iran said sanctions would compel Tehran to accede to U.S. demands, but the strategy failed. Iran resumed enriching uranium at higher levels and increased its aggression in the Middle East. The U.S. can offer some relief from specific sanctions now, unwinding the failed strategy and helping to return both sides to compliance with the JCPOA. No matter what happens in current nuclear talks, however, U.S.-Iran diplomacy should continue, and the U.S. should avoid unnecessary war with Iran.
President Biden has continued to pursue a policy of regime change via sanctions on Venezuela, extending a failed approach started by President Trump. This policy has no bearing on U.S. security and is counterproductive from a humanitarian standpoint. Nicolás Maduro is a harsh dictator, but unlikely to fall. Indeed, sanctions helps immiserate Venezuelans for no good reason.
The Quad has transformed in recent years into a multilateral forum to enhance military coordination in the Indo-Pacific among the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia and to address issues of mutual concern, including China. But the Quad is not—and should not become—an anti-China alliance. Pushing the Quad toward such a goal undermines U.S. interests and risks unnecessary conflict, possibly even nuclear war.
While much has changed since the Cold War, it remains in the U.S. interest to avoid Russia and China—the only two near-peer, nuclear-armed U.S. competitors—combining their economic and military power. The current U.S. approach of dual containment encourages their cooperation. Mounting a global campaign pitting democracies against autocracies adds to that pressure. The U.S. should focus on reducing tension with Moscow to improve the chances of productive diplomacy and limit incentive for Russia to cooperate with China against the U.S.
U.S. forces deployed to Iraq in 2014 to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate there, which was achieved more than three years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Iraq. The U.S. can minimize the risks of war, dissolve unnecessary commitments, and focus on higher priorities by withdrawing the remaining 2,500 troops and allowing Iraqi security forces to take responsibility for Iraq’s security.
U.S. forces originally deployed to Syria to help annihilate ISIS’s territorial caliphate, which was achieved more than two years ago. No core U.S. interest today requires a military presence in Syria. Maintaining the current deployment needlessly prolongs the civil war, exacerbates suffering there as a result of the war's continuation, and risks drawing the U.S. into wider conflict.
The U.S. must find a way to co-exist with Russia to advance U.S. interests and avoid a nuclear conflict. Endless cycles of sanctions, diplomatic expulsions, antipathy, and saber-rattling obscure an important reality. Inflating the threat Russia poses to the U.S., or confusing its violations of liberal values with hard security interests, risks conflict that could go nuclear. The good news for the U.S. is that Russia is not the Soviet Union, and while Russia still fields a formidable military, its overall power is limited and best held in check by European powers, not by the U.S. military.
The U.S. Constitution reserves the power to declare war to the legislative branch, but in recent years Congress has ceded that responsibility to the executive branch. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 has been misunderstood and misconstrued. Open-ended and vague authorizations for the use of military force have resulted in sprawling and endless wars divorced from original objectives. Only Congress can reclaim its constitutional authority in conducting U.S. foreign policy.
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are not treaty allies and never have been. Moreover, today the U.S. can meet its narrow interests in the Middle East without providing unconditional support to Saudi Arabia. Catering excessively to the kingdom’s demands, supporting its foreign policy, and stationing U.S. troops on Saudi soil undermine U.S. interests. Instead, the U.S. should recalibrate Saudi relations to maintain a less accommodating, more balanced and business-like relationship.
The Biden administration has three options in Afghanistan: (1) keep the U.S. commitment to exit by May 1; (2) prolong the war by breaking the U.S.-Taliban agreement; or (3) prolong the war by attempting to negotiate with the Taliban for an extension. Withdrawing by May 1 is optimal. The U.S. can better secure its counterterrorism goals while not imperiling U.S. troops in Afghanistan any longer, or spending billions of dollars more on a conflict two decades of evidence shows is futile and wasteful to perpetuate.
Washington has increasingly turned to sanctions in recent years, even as they fail to achieve desired policy outcomes and dilute U.S. power overtime. Overreliance on financial sanctions, for example, risks the U.S. dollar’s status as the dominant reserve currency. Correcting the errors of U.S. sanctions policy demands a serious reevaluation of all sanctions, a higher bar for imposing new sanctions, and a coordinated effort to curtail financial and secondary sanctions in particular.
Two U.S. administrations in a row have supported the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen’s civil war, a violent caldron for local and regional grievances. U.S. participation in this war prolongs it; exacerbates human suffering; and gives the main U.S. concern in Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, greater space to operate. Involvement in this proxy war undermines U.S. interests and values—ending our support would encourage Saudi Arabia to settle and help end the conflict.