Backgrounder: U.S. interests in the Middle East and President Trump’s visit

As President Trump embarks on his first trip to the Middle East, fundamental questions arise about U.S. interests there. The chaos in the region over the last several months has made it easy to lose sight of the big picture, but American interests in the Middle East are simple, achievable, and diminishing.

Persian Gulf oil isn’t under threat.

• For decades, the number one U.S. priority in the Middle East has been maintaining global market access to Persian Gulf oil, but that interest isn’t particularly threatened.
• As we’ve seen time and again, oil markets can adapt to solve supply problems on their own. Global oil inventories are roughly 7.6 billion barrels, enough to replace all Middle Eastern oil for roughly 285 days, so there is ample cushion in case of disruptions.
• With oil prices low, now is a good time to refill the U.S. strategic petroleum reserve, which currently holds about 400 million barrels, to its maximum capacity of 714 million barrels.

China poses no problems for the U.S. in the Middle East.

• China doesn’t threaten the main U.S. interest in the Middle East—access to oil—because it’s too far away, has other priorities, and benefits from open global oil markets.
• As I argue in a recent Defense Priorities explainer “China can’t dominate the Middle East,” “China’s modest aims in the region” have “more to do with hedging against U.S. threats to Chinese oil access.”

The United States shouldn’t give more to Saudi Arabia.

• The United States should not offer a new defense commitment to the Saudis. Because China couldn’t fill the vacuum if the U.S. steps back, and Persian Gulf oil is resilient to disruption anyway, protecting the Saudis provides little benefit and merely pulls the U.S. deeper into the region’s dysfunction.
• Civilian nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia doesn’t require a U.S. security guarantee. But it would be unwise for the United States to transfer to Saudi Arabia uranium enrichment technology that could someday be militarized into a nuclear weapons program.

The United States should not launch preventive strikes against Iran.

• Iran has been capable of building nuclear weapons for years but has not done so. Striking Iran’s nuclear program risks starting another open-ended war in the region that would entangle the U.S. indefinitely and incentivize Iran to obtain nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes.
• Iran won’t completely dismantle its uranium enrichment capabilities and was not required to do so under the 2015 nuclear deal with the United States. Demanding that Iran fully abandon enrichment is a poison pill that risks scuttling negotiations.

The United States should reduce its troop presence in the Middle East.

• The recent reduction of U.S. forces in Syria is a positive step, but it doesn’t go far enough. Decreasing the military footprint is a tacit acknowledgement that there are no major U.S. security interests in Syria. The United States should finally bring home its troops who have been deployed there for years without a clear mission.
• U.S. deployments to the Middle East have needlessly strained the military, as shown by the accidental losses of three U.S. fighter jets in the region over just the last six months.

For the last several decades, U.S. policy in the Middle East has sought to manage rivalries and even decide who governs. These policies have proven counterproductive for both the United States and the region. The lessons are clear: the U.S. should finally acknowledge just how stable its few interests in the Middle East are and let the region resolve its own troubles.

Author

Rosemary
Kelanic

Director, Middle East Program

Defense Priorities