Policy priorities
- Avoid escalation to direct U.S.- or NATO-Russia conflict, which would risk nuclear war. Instead, the United States should pursue a more defensive strategy paired with an energetic diplomatic effort that makes an eventual end to the conflict more likely.
- Shift most of the burden of aiding Ukraine to NATO-Europe, wealthy nations capable of balancing and deterring Russian aggression.
- Rule out U.S. security guarantees for Ukraine—in NATO or otherwise—which would come with unjustified costs and risks for the United States andfoster unrealistic expectations and ambitions in Kyiv.
Understanding the U.S. role in the conflict
Russia is responsible for its invasion of Ukraine, an unjustified preventive war. But that does not redeem the recklessness of U.S. policy there prior to the invasion, which helped put Ukraine in the crosshairs. Dangling the prospect of NATO expansion in front of Ukraine, whether in the formal sense of admitting Ukraine or just stationing NATO forces there, predictably triggered Russian aggression. Moreover, the false prospect of direct U.S. military intervention to protect Ukraine likely encouraged Kyiv to eschew unpleasant compromises with Russia, such as a pledge of neutrality, as would have been recommended by Ukraine’s geography and circumstances. Washington, in other words, elevated Ukraine on Russia’s list of security concerns and gave Kyiv false hope the U.S. would directly defend it. This policy is irresponsible and continues today.
The United States continues to give Ukraine false hope by promising to guarantee its security at some vague future point and by encouraging its leaders to see U.S. aid as a means to achieve maximalist objectives, rather than accept some lost territory. Even more substantial aid is unlikely to enable Ukraine to dislodge Russia from all occupied—or even most of the illegally annexed—provinces of Ukraine. The prospect of Ukraine ejecting Russia is remote, and even if it were more possible, given the unacceptable risks of escalation, U.S. aid should be structured to encourage the Ukrainian government to adopt a defensive strategy and pursue more seriously diplomatic options to end the war. This approach does not accept, let alone endorse, the permanent dismembering of Ukraine. It simply accepts the low odds of Ukraine reclaiming that territory and the futility of throwing more money and Ukrainian lives away in service of unattainable goals, while also recognizing the high costs and risks of continuing to pursue maximalist goals in the war.
U.S. aid to Ukraine should be designed around a defensive strategy that helps Ukraine defend itself. It should also come with an expiration date: Kyiv should be told not to expect aid on this level indefinitely, which should further encourage it to adopt realistic policies—without false distortions about the true balance of power.
U.S. interests in Ukraine
U.S. policy toward the war in Ukraine should serve U.S. interests, which diverge from Ukraine’s. The United States has large—even existential—reasons to avoid war with Russia, whereas Ukraine, already under Russian attack, would like the United States to run those risks. U.S. policymakers ignore this difference of opinion at the peril of us all.
The United States does get some benefit from Ukraine’s battlefield success, but those gains are not vital for our security. It is good for any state’s attempt at violent conquest to fail—and/or come at a high price—because this strengthens a norm of territorial integrity, which benefits the U.S. and all countries. The U.S. may also benefit from a militarily weakened Russia, which may pose less of a threat to us and the countries we are committed to defend. However, strategic failure and a weakened Russia were achieved when Moscow’s offensive collapsed in failure in 2022. Any benefits to the United States from the continuation of the war, if any exist at all, are limited and diminishing. And they come at a high and increasing cost in dollars, risks, and diverting U.S. attention from higher priorities.
U.S. security does not require Ukraine to eject Russia from most or all of its territory—a remote prospect— or for peace to be imposed on Ukraine’s terms.
Even without a full Ukrainian victory, Russia has been humbled and discouraged from further conquest in Europe. There is little indication of Russian desire for further attacks, especially against NATO countries. Ukraine is uniquely important to the Kremlin—it isn’t just nearby land to seize. And the war has demonstrated that Russia lacks capability to threaten countries much farther afield. Russia was militarily weaker than most analysts appreciated in 2022, and it has gotten weaker since due to significant equipment and manpower losses. Even if Russia did gain control of all of Ukraine—an implausible outcome—it would not do much to enable further expansion given its small economy (its pre-war GDP was $200 billion) and the likelihood of ongoing, burdensome resistance. Russian control of Ukraine would also harden the defenses of neighboring countries, making further attacks harder, not easier.
Even without Ukraine’s total victory, this war demonstrates states cannot violate other states’ sovereignty with impunity. Rather than invite a global wave of aggression, if there is a lesson to take from Russia’s experience in Ukraine, it is that the costs of territorial expansion and violating a neighbor’s sovereignty are likely to exceed any benefits. But it’s doubtful that aggressing states look to foreign examples anyway, rather than local balances of power and perceived interests. Russia suffered tremendous losses as a result of the war, was widely sanctioned, and catalyzed counterbalancing from the United States and many European countries. The fighting has demonstrated why modern military technology and nationalism serve the territorial status quo. Russia’s example is more a warning not to pursue conquest than an example that others, including China, would emulate. That outcome serves the norm of sovereignty, even if Ukraine does not regain another inch of its lost territory.
The absence of strong reasons for the United States to ensure that Ukraine wins a clear victory does not mean abandoning Ukraine entirely. But it suggests treating aid to Ukraine more as a charitable act borne of moral conviction, than a security imperative, and hence carefully limiting U.S. risks.
The major U.S. interests in Ukraine are negative in that they’re things we wish not to happen: first and foremost, to avoid escalation to direct war with apocalyptic risk. Beyond that, the United States has an interest in limiting its direct costs and avoiding the diplomatic fallout of long-term enmity with Russia. Burden-shifting to Europe and avoiding security guarantees to Ukraine serve these interests.
Escalation risks
The U.S.-Russia relationship has deteriorated significantly, which should not be taken lightly given the imperative (for both countries and humanity) that Washington and Moscow peacefully coexist. The impulse to use the war to harm Russia beyond what serves the defense of Ukraine is dangerous. The fact that no significant escalation has occurred so far should not be an invitation to take greater risks. The prospect of war between Russia and NATO, which automatically threatens nuclear annihilation, should be taken very seriously.
The United States should strive to avoid both escalation in the sense of the war spilling beyond Ukraine and in the sense of nuclear weapons being used. Any direct NATO involvement in the war would substantially increase the risk of an escalatory Russia response—including nuclear weapons. Allowing NATO to fight in Ukraine would risk Russian attacks on NATO countries and escalation to all-out war. Aiding Ukrainian attacks into Russia is also risky and should be avoided. The recent decision by the Biden administration to give Ukraine permission to use U.S. weapons to strike Russian territory directly from Kharkiv should be reversed.
After two years of avoiding direct involvement, it is not credible that the United States would attack Russia and risk nuclear war over Ukraine. The United States lacks a core interest in the conflict, whereas the stakes for Russia are much higher. However, U.S. rhetoric of unwavering support for Ukraine and the continuous supply of weapons and ammunition might give the Ukrainian leadership false confidence about the extent to which they can rely on U.S. support. Ukraine should make their own decisions about the risks they run with offensives, but they should know they bear those risks, not the United States.
Although it is not a direct confrontation with Russia, U.S. military aid to Ukraine still involves its own escalatory risk, depending on how the weapons are used and how their use is perceived by Russia. There must be nuanced deliberations about the types and quantities of weapons we provide, as well as clarity about the conditions that Washington places on those arms and around U.S. and Ukrainian goals and strategies, which are different given the different interests of the two countries.
The Biden administration’s policy of telling Russia nuclear use would be catastrophic to its interests is sensible. This could be augmented by statements saying Russian nuclear use in Ukraine will only create more U.S. support for Ukrainian forces—suggesting that using nuclear weapons will not bring Russia victory in order to undermine the case for doing so.
Number of nuclear weapons in each country’s stockpile
The U.S. and Russia hold nearly nine of every 10 deployed and stored nuclear warheads in the world. Avoiding a nuclear conflict remains the highest U.S. national security priority because of the devastating and long-lasting consequences of any nuclear explosion.
Burden shifting
Russia has so far failed to militarily conquer all of Ukraine and doesn’t look likely to do so in the near future. It failed in its first phase, failed to retake the Donbas even post-mobilization, and has so far failed to retake the other Ukrainian provinces it illegally annexed. The bungled invasion of Ukraine has exposed conventional Russian weakness and poor Russian strategy. It is clear that Russia is not capable of posing a major conventional military threat to Europe (or even Eastern European NATO nations).
The United States should therefore rely on its wealthy and capable allies to do far more in providing for their continent’s security. The United States can significantly scale down its military presence in Europe and encourage greater strategic autonomy among Europeans. Rather than discourage Europeans from developing collective defense capabilities without U.S. help, Washington should encourage it.
Pre-war balance of power between NATO-Europe and Russia
The 30 NATO European members are more than capable of balancing Russia’s military power.
Furthermore, Europe should do the heavy lifting in Ukraine. The United States has provided billions in economic and military aid; at the very least, Europe should be taking on more of the economic support for Kyiv. And it should take primary responsibility for the West’s role in Ukraine’s reconstruction whenever the war ends. A stable Ukraine is an important factor in European security, so the Europeans should accept the economic responsibility of supporting Ukraine to safeguard their own interests.
No security guarantee
The United States should not guarantee Ukraine’s security, whether through the NATO alliance or some other means. A security guarantee, meaning a pledge to defend Ukraine, would run unjustified risks for the United States for no security benefit and potentially encourage overconfident decision-making in Ukraine and other European countries (including some NATO members). The June 2024 security deal is limited to U.S. assistance in strengthening Ukraine’s own credible defense and deterrence capabilities, and should not be mistaken for a formal guarantee.
Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security would, by design, increase the risk of a U.S. or NATO war with Russia and the likelihood of nuclear escalation. Those escalatory dangers are one reason why the United States refuses to fight directly for Ukraine against Russia in the current conflict. Even with a security guarantee, such risks would continue to induce similar caution towards U.S. involvement. Therefore, lacking a major interest, U.S. promises to defend Ukraine are unlikely to be credible in the eyes of the Russians.
While U.S. security guarantees would not be credible, they would likely harm Ukraine on balance. For one, their prospect would preserve a cause of war, making the conflict harder to end should real peace talks occur. That is, a Ukraine in NATO or a bilateral security guarantee between Ukraine and the United States is a red line for Russia. The Russians have demonstrated their willingness to go to war to prevent such a security arrangement for Ukraine and it should be taken seriously that they would do so again. Second, Ukrainian leaders might put undue faith in any security guarantees, leading them to make dangerous choices based on the false prospect of U.S. protection. For example, they might avoid opportunities to negotiate an end to the war because they see a balance of military power, including U.S. help, that is not real.
Russia has pushed back on any plans from the United States and its allies to provide Ukraine with security assurances as a dangerous impingement on Russian security. Guaranteeing Ukraine’s security now, in the midst of war, would demand a choice between ignoring the commitment and undermining other U.S. security guarantees, or fighting for Ukraine and possibly sparking a nuclear crisis. What the United States can credibly offer Ukraine is armed neutrality, where the United States, ideally with European allies taking the lead, provides Ukraine with arms and training without security guarantees.
Prioritizing U.S. interests
It is sensible to aid Ukraine to punish and weaken Russia, but we should not confuse that with a pressing security need for Ukraine to win, let alone retake all its land. Nor should we let sympathy for Ukraine blind us to the costs of involvement in its war: heavy budgetary costs, escalation risks, trashed relations with one of the world’s biggest powers, and a degree of moral responsibility for fueling bloody conflict that otherwise might end, saving many lives. Reasonable people can debate whether these costs are worth heavily aiding Ukraine, but the war should not be dismissed as costless for Americans. While aid continues, it should be linked to a defensive strategy and openness to peace negotiations with Russia. The United States should more aggressively seek to shift the costs of defending Ukraine to Europe and make clear to all, especially the belligerents, that security guarantees to Ukraine are off the table.
The United States does not have major security interests at stake in the ongoing war in Ukraine. In a limited sense, the United States has benefited from the war’s damage to the Russian military and its demonstration that aggression does not pay. But those benefits were gained early in the war, and the continuation of the fighting does not serve the interests of the United States. Russia has proven incapable of larger conquest in Europe, if it ever truly had the will to do so, and has demonstrated that the European states are more than capable of balancing against the Russian state. Meanwhile the costs and risks to the United States persist.